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The Wells School of Philosophy
Roll Call
21st October 2025, Hare Lane, 1030-1230 hrs:
Tutors:
Linda (L),
Steve (S)
Present:
Alexis (A),
Margie (M),
Patricia (P),
Ray (R),
Robin (ℜ),
Viki (V)
Scribe:
Gavin (G)
Apologies:
Colin (C),
Howard (H),
John (J)
Valete:
David
The homework suggested by Ray
A topic that comes to mind for our future possible deliberations and debate is that which involves the extensive subject of Consciousness. This has taxed those from many areas of interest, not least in areas of science both physical and human. Given the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness' (after the philosopher David Chalmers) makes for a fruitful area for philosophical examination. The 'hard problem' asks why and how physical brain processes give rise to subjective experiences, or qualia — the "what it's like" feeling of experiencing something, such as the colour red or the taste of chocolate. It is essentially distinct from the 'easy problems', which focus on explaining the cognitive and behavioural functions of the brain.
The 'hard problem' highlights an explanatory gap between objective and physical states and subjective, phenomenal experiences, as scientific explanations of brain function don't inherently explain the felt nature of consciousness.
If this was not enough we might follow on with consideration of the possible impacts of expanding AI developments in this field.
Questions set by Steve
Here are ten questions we might ponder as preparation, in no particular order:
- 1. Can consciousness exist without language, for example in framing moral judgements/criteria?
- 1a. Or do we just 'feel' what's right or wrong?
- 2. Is there some sort of 'collective unconsciousness' which is shared via human interaction? Agreed ways of living out the distinctive human condition?
- 3. If you try to break down consciousness into its component elements, and how these interact, and by implication, its causes, is there something necessarily left out/over?
- 3a. If so, what? Is consciousness necessarily more than the sum of its parts?
- 4. Where do moral judgements fit into consciousness, and what it is, uniquely, to be a human being? For example, being instinctively sympathetic to our fellow humans, a la Rousseau, or aggressively individualistic, a la Hobbes (?Trump?)
- 5. Can we really 'explain' consciousness? Will we ever? Are current views simply barking up the wrong tree, being materially based, when substance/matter could be considered as energy-based? We do talk about 'life forces'…
- 6. What hope for the future might the 'fire together, wire together' concept referred to in the IOT on consciousness and imagination yield?…that it's possible constantly for people to change as a consequence of experiences, and not be locked into our genomes? And relatedly:
- 7. Can greater understanding of consciousness help us celebrate neurodiversity; the notion that we're all unique and can enrich our consciousness via human interaction? Moreover, that consciousness is dynamic…
- 8. Can we ever know what it's like to be a bat? Or are we restricted to only knowing how I feel a bat feels…?
- 9. Where is our imagination based? What is it exactly, and what's role? Does it confer evolutionary advantages?
- 10. Without a body can a 'brain in a vat' ever achieve consciousness? Would brains in a vat share their consciousnesses?
Discussion
- The dualism debate emerged from Descartes. Opposing theories include materialism (and idealism).(R)
- The hard problem asks why organisms have qualia.(R)
- The human mind cannot comprehend itself.(R)
- We should accept the irreducibility of consciousness and experience.(R)
- We (most of us) have 86 billion neurons in our brains.(R)
- What are we to make of the 1st person nature of consciousness?(R)
The physicists have their say…
- Neuroscience and quantum mechanics may help to provide an explanation.(R)
- Roger Penrose wondered about the substance of the space between atoms. And how could a particleBe be in two places simultaneously?(L)
- Perhaps scientists should be looking for energies rather than particles.(S)
- Penrose said No to the use of computational devices as an analogue for the mind.(L)
- Like Spinoza, Einstein was a strict determinist who believed that human behavior was completely determined by causal laws. "I do not believe in free will. Schopenhauer's words: 'Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills,' accompany me in all situations throughout my life."
- Hawking argued that consciousness is a product of the brain and that the brain's ability to perform consciousness is the result of its physical makeup. He proposed that quantum effects in the brain play a role in conscious experience.
Consciousness and Understandinng
- If the brain is dead, there can be no consciousness.(A)
- Many animals exhibit consciousness.(A)
- Nagel's focus on the bat is very specific. Radar taps into things we cannot perceive.(S)
- There are levels of unconsciousness. Psychedelic drugs can raise one's level of consciousness.(V)
- Searle's Chinese Translation thought experiment: Suppose that AI research has succeeded in programming a computer to behave as if it understands Chinese. The machine accepts Chinese characters as input, carries out each instruction of the program step by step, and then produces Chinese characters as output. The machine does this so perfectly that no one can tell that they are communicating with a machine and not a hidden Chinese speaker. Does the machine actually understand the conversation, or is it just simulating the ability to understand the conversation? Does the machine have a mind in exactly the same sense that people do, or is it just acting as if it had a mind?
- Now suppose that Searle is in a room with an English version of the program. Chinese characters are slipped in under the door, he follows the program step-by-step, which eventually instructs him to slide other Chinese characters back out under the door. If the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it follows that Searle would do so as well, simply by running the program by hand. Searle saw no essential difference between the roles of the computer and himself in the experiment. Each simply follows a program, step-by-step, producing behavior that makes them appear to understand. However, Searle would not be able to understand the conversation. Therefore, he argued, it follows that the computer would not be able to understand the conversation either.(L)
Memory, emotions and therapy
- There may be an evolutionary advantage to being able to shut out bad memories.(L)
- Sometimes one needs therapy to draw out suppressed emotions and forgotten traumas.(ℜ)
- People with dementia often remember their feelings but not the event itself.(A)
- Often memories come back spontaneously. We live in the past of our accumulated memories.(R)
- "How do you feel?" Saying "Fine" may be a man thing.(R)
- “Fine” is a way of protecting your vulnerability. "How are you?" is just a polite question.(M)
- People build up defences to cope with immense traumas and they are not even aware of them. They are encouraged then to recall the pain, and then be released.(ℜ)
- How can we receive disapprobation if no one gives their true response?(R)
Down the Smartphone rabbit-hole again…
- We pick up cues in our interactions. But children don’t get this opportunity if they spend all their time on screens.(V)
- There are grounds for hope in primary schools. Dutch schools get children to resolve problems in 'circle time' until they are 12 years of age. They spend less time on computers.(M)
- 2-3 people sharing a computer learn a lot more than one computer per pupil.(A)
- So one increases productivity by spending less!(R)
And the USA…
- How many US citizens have changed their moral views as a result of the election of Trump?(ℜ)
- Cultures change.(V)
- There has been a huge change in people’s moral views in the USA.(A)
- The Trump administration is part of a trend on the right that views emotional empathy as a weakness.(S)
Souls and the Meaning of Life
- In Philip Pullman's 'His Dark Materials', the souls of the characters are represented by animal companions called daemons.(M)
- Why are we here? What is our purpose in life?(S)
Poetry mentioned
Adlestrop
- Yes. I remember Adlestrop
- The name, because one afternoon
- Of heat, the express-train drew up there
- Unwontedly. It was late June.
- The steam hissed. Someone cleared his throat.
- No one left and no one came
- On the bare platform. What I saw
- Was Adlestrop—only the name
- And willows, willow-herb, and grass,
- And meadowsweet, and haycocks dry,
- No whit less still and lonely fair
- Than the high cloudlets in the sky.
- And for that minute a blackbird sang
- Close by, and round him, mistier,
- Farther and farther, all the birds
- Of Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire.
- Edward Thomas
Books referenced
- [1] Aleks Krotoski (2025). 'The Immortalists: The Death of Death and the Race for Eternal Life'. Bodley Head.
- [2] Sebastian Faulks (2025). 'Fires Which Burned Brightly: A Life in Progress'. Hutchinson Heinemann.
- [3] Holly Farrell (2020). 'RHS Gardening for Mindfulness'. Mitchell Beazley.
- [4] Robin Skynner and John Cleese (1983). 'Families and How to Survive Them'. Methuen.
- [5] Philip Pullman (1998). 'The Golden Compass'. Ballantine Books.
Consciousness Glossary
C
consciousness Modern neuroscience definition: any kind of subjective experience whatsoever. Hegel's definition: the relation of the "Ego" to an object, which can be either external or internal
D
dualism the belief that consciousness (mind) and physical matter are separate substaces or modes of existence, raising the tricky oroblem of how the two ever interact.
E
epiphenomenalism a philosophical theory stating that mental events are caused by physical brain events, but the mental events themselves have no causal effect on the physical world. Mental states are considered by-products, or "epiphenomena," of physical processes, like steam from a locomotive which has no effect on its work.
F
functionalism the idea that consciousness depends, not on what a system is made of, but only on what the system does, on the functions it performs, on how it tranforms inputs into outputs.
I
idealism the idea that consciousness (or mind) is the ultimate source of reality, not phsical stuff or matter.
L
locked-in syndrome a condition where consciousness is fully present despite total paralysis of the body.
M
materialism see PHYSICALISM.
mysterianism the idea that there may exist a complete physical explanation of consciousness, but that we humans will never be clever enough to discover this solution.
N
naive dualism the seductive intuition that conscious expereinces seem non-physical, driving a belief about how things actually are.
O
ontology the study of what exists; a set of concepts and categories in a subject area or domain that shows their properties and the relations between them.
P
panpsychism the idea that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe, alongside other fundamental properties such as mass/energy and charge; that it is present to some degree everywhere and in everything.
phenomenology the subjective properties of conscious experience.
physicalism the idea that the universe is made of physical stuff, and that conscious states are either identical to, or somehow emerge from, particular arrangements of this physical stuff.
Q
qualia the subjective, conscious experiences of an individual, such as the taste of a lemon, the pain of a headache, or the redness of a sunset.
V
vegetative state a catastrophic condition in which a person still cycles through sleep and wakefulness but shows no behavioural signs of conscious awareness.
vitalism the belief that the property of being alive could only be explained by appealing to some special sauce: a spark of life.
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